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Abstract
In this paper, we integrate efficiency wage setting with the theory of optimal redistributive
income taxation. In doing so, we use a model with two skill types, where efficiency wage
setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low-skilled, whereas the high-skilled face
a conventional, competitive labor market. We show that the marginal income tax implemented
for the high-skilled is negative under plausible assumptions. The marginal income tax facing
the low-skilled can be either positive or negative, in general. An increase in unemployment
benefits contributes to a relaxation of the binding self-selection constraint, which makes this
instrument particularly useful from the perspective of redistribution.
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I. Introduction
The modern theory of optimal redistributive taxation, as developed from
the influential contribution of Mirrlees (1971), is largely based on models
where the labor market is perfectly competitive. Although analytically
convenient, such a description of the labor market is clearly at odds with
most real-world developed economies, where unemployment has been an
important social problem for a long time. Albeit small by comparison, a
body of literature on optimal redistributive taxation under unemployment
has gradually evolved during the latest decades, in which the incentives
underlying an optimal tax policy partly differ from those following under
perfect competition. The major mechanisms generating unemployment in
these studies are trade-union wage formation (e.g., Aronsson and Sjo¨gren,
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2 Optimal taxation and efficiency wages
2003, 2004; Aronsson et al., 2009; Hummel and Jacobs, 2018), minimum
wages (Marceau and Boadway, 1994), and search frictions (Lehmann
et al., 2011). Although fundamentally different, a common denominator is
a policy incentive to reduce the level of unemployment, which is likely to
result in higher marginal tax rates than under perfect competition.
However, to our knowledge, there have been no earlier studies on
optimal redistributive taxation in economies where the labor market is
characterized by efficiency wages. The purpose of the present paper is to
fill this gap by integrating efficiency wages in the self-selection approach to
optimal taxation. Such an extension is interesting for several reasons. First,
efficiency wage theory has played an important role in labor economics
for a long time, by explaining involuntary unemployment as well as wage
differentials across workers and sectors.1 Second, it has been used in
related areas of public economics as a framework for studying relationships
between tax policy, wages, and unemployment in representative-agent
models (e.g., Pisauro, 1991; Chang, 1995). Third, and compared with
the related literature on trade-union behavior, efficiency wage theory does
not rely on any (arbitrary) assumption of objective function for trade-
unions,2 because the wage rate is decided unilaterally by firms realizing
that increased wages lead to higher productivity.3
Our study is based on a model with two skill types,4 where efficiency
wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low-skilled,
whereas the high-skilled face a conventional, competitive labor market.
The rationale for this assumption is that unemployment is typically higher
and more persistent among low-skilled individuals than among high-
skilled individuals. This suggests that it is more important to examine the
mechanisms generating equilibrium unemployment in the context of agents
1SeeKatz (1986) for an overview of efficiencywagemodels. See also Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
2See Kaufman (2002) for an overview of models with trade-unionized labor markets.
3It is not easy to discriminate empirically between efficiency wage models and other labor market
models that generate equilibrium unemployment. However, one specific feature of efficiency
wage models is that workers employed in firms where shirking is difficult to detect, or where
the supervisory intensity is low, will earn more, ceteris paribus. Empirical evidence pointing in
this direction is presented in, for example, Kruse (1992), Rebitzer (1995), and Ewing and Payne
(1999). See Neal (1993) for a study contradicting these results.Another specific feature is that the
effort choice of workers is likely to depend on industry characteristics (because the organization
of work, as well as of supervision andmonitoring, is likely to vary across industries). Krueger and
Summers (1988) examine wage differentials across equally skilled workers and find substantial
differentials related to industry; a finding that is consistent with efficiency wage theory (albeit not
likely to arise under competitive wage formation). See Moretti and Perloff (2002) for evidence
suggesting that wage formation in the US agricultural labor market is consistent with efficiency
wage theory.
4The discrete two-type version of the Mirrleesian optimal income tax problem was developed in
its original form by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982).
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with relatively low productivity. The government uses a nonlinear income
tax and an unemployment benefit to correct for the imperfection in the
labor market and to redistribute income from high-skilled to low-skilled
individuals. We assume that two types of jobs are available in the economy:
low-demanding jobs, which can be carried out both by low-skilled and high-
skilled individuals, and high-demanding jobs, which can only be carried out
by high-skilled individuals. We also assume that effort, which is thought of
as the “effort exerted per hour spent at the workplace”, is a decision-variable
in low-demanding jobs, meaning that individuals employed in this type of
job have the option to shirk with an exogenous probability of detection
(through imperfect monitoring).5 As a consequence, there are two ways for
a high-skilled individual to mimic the income of a low-skilled type: either
by choosing a low-demanding job, or by reducing the hours of work when
employed in a high-demanding job. In turn, the government must recognize
both these options when solving the optimal tax and expenditure problem.
We show that the marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-
skilled is negative under reasonable assumptions, while the marginal income
tax rate implemented for the low-skilled can be either positive or negative.
The intuition for the first result is that an increase in the hours of work
by high-skilled individuals leads to increased demand for low-skilled labor,
thus counteracting the unemployment problem. The policy rule for marginal
income taxation of low-skilled individuals reflects a mixture of effects
generated through the binding self-selection constraint and the possibility
to affect wage formation and employment through tax policy. Whereas
employment-related motives (and thus the ability to raise more tax revenue)
typically push in the direction of increased marginal income taxation
for low-skilled individuals, the self-selection constraint might affect the
marginal tax policy in the opposite direction depending on which of the
two strategies the mimicker prefers. If the mimicker adopts the strategy
of reducing the hours of work when employed in a high-demanding job,
as briefly discussed above, it is possible that a decrease in the marginal
income tax rate implemented for low-skilled individuals contributes to relax
the binding self-selection constraint (this is not possible under the other
mimicking strategy of choosing a low-demanding job). We also find that
5Notice that imperfect monitoring in low-demanding jobs generates a second source of
asymmetric information, between firms and workers employed in low-demanding jobs, on top of
the standard asymmetric information problembetween the government and theworkers (regarding
their skill type). In this sense, our paper also relates to a recent strand in the Mirrleesian literature
(see Stantcheva, 2014; Bastani et al., 2015; Cremer and Roeder, 2017) analyzing optimal tax
policy in settings with two sources of asymmetric information. The difference is that whereas, in
the aforementioned papers, the second source of asymmetric information manifested itself in an
adverse selection problem, in our model it manifests itself in a moral hazard problem.
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an increase in the unemployment benefit leads to a relaxation of the binding
self-selection constraint, irrespective of which strategy the mimicker prefers.
This suggests that the unemployment benefit is likely better targeted to low-
skilled individuals than a corresponding benefit paid out to low-income
earners in general.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we present the
model by describing the decision-problem and the behavior of individuals
and firms, and the optimal tax and expenditure problem facing the
government. The optimal public policy is characterized and discussed in
Section III, while our conclusions are summarized in Section IV. All the
proofs are presented in an Online Appendix.
II. The Model
The economy is populated by two skill types. High-skilled workers are paid
the before-tax wage rate wh, and low-skilled workers are paid the before-
tax wage rate w , where wh > w . The total population is normalized to
one and the fraction of individuals of type j is denoted π j (for j = , h).
Two different types of jobs are available in the economy: low-demanding
jobs that can be carried out by all workers, and high-demanding jobs that
are exclusive to high-skilled workers. Whereas the high-demanding jobs
pay a competitive wage, the low-demanding jobs are characterized by a
monitoring technology such that the employers pay a wage above the market
clearing level in order to boost the effort level of the employees. This
generates involuntary unemployment among low-skilled workers.
Individuals and Firms
Denoting consumption by c, hours spent at the workplace by L, and effort
exerted at the workplace by e ∈ [0, 1], individual preferences are represented
by the concave and partially additive separable utility function
U = g(c) + v(L, e). (1)
Individuals derive utility from consumption, and disutility from work hours
and effort, respectively (i.e., ∂g/∂c > 0, ∂v/∂L < 0, and ∂v/∂e < 0). To
simplify the interpretation of the results, we also add the (quite realistic)
assumption that ∂2v/∂e∂L < 0; that is, the marginal utility of leisure
(−∂v/∂L) increases with the effort exerted when working. Furthermore,
we assume that v(0, 0) = 0.
For workers employed in high-demanding jobs, where there is no
monitoring problem and competitive wages are paid, we assume that the
effort exerted by workers is equal to 1, which can be interpreted to mean
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that workers in high-demanding jobs never shirk.6 Instead, for workers
employed in low-demanding jobs, effort is a choice variable and affects
the probability of being fired. The probability of being monitored in low-
demanding jobs is assumed to be exogenous, and a worker is fired if caught
shirking.7 Assuming that the firms monitor each worker in a low-demanding
job with probability p, and interpreting 1− e as the fraction of time that an
individual spends shirking while on the job, the probability of being fired
is given by (1 − e)p ≡ ϕ(e), where ∂ϕ(e)/∂e < 0 and ∂2ϕ(e)/(∂e)2 = 0. If
fired, low-skilled workers face two alternatives: they can either be hired by
another firm or become unemployed.8 The economy-wide unemployment
rate is denoted by u.
In the tradition of the optimal income tax literature following Mirrlees
(1971), we assume that an individual’s skill type (as reflected in the
before-tax wage rate) is private information, while the individual’s income
if employed, I j = w jL j , is publicly observable. This rules out first-
best type-specific lump-sum taxes but allows income to be taxed via a
general, nonlinear tax schedule, T(I j). The other policy instrument at the
disposal of the government is a transfer, b, paid to each unemployed
individual. To characterize the set of (constrained) Pareto-efficient resource
allocations, we derive an optimal revelation mechanism. For our purpose,
a mechanism consists of a set of type-specific before-tax incomes I j and
disposable incomes B j for individuals in employment, an unemployment
benefit b, and the unemployment rate u. A complete solution to the optimal
tax problem per se, such that I j and B j are determined via individual
utility maximization, then requires the design of a general income tax
function, T(·), such that B j = I j −T(I j). This is described in greater detail
below.
We begin by characterizing the decision-problem and the behavior of
individuals and firms, and we then continue with the optimal tax and
expenditure problem. Each individual of any type j acts as an atomistic
agent by treating the hourly wage rates, the unemployment benefit, the
unemployment rate, and the parameters of the tax function (including the
structure of marginal taxation) as exogenous.9 Private consumption equals
6This is clearly a simplification – albeit a consequence of the assumption of a perfectly competitive
market for this type of job. A possible interpretation is that the job characteristics make shirking
impossible or uninteresting for those employed in high-demanding jobs.
7Assuming away turnover costs, this turns out to be the best strategy for a firm (see Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984, p. 437).
8With all firms being identical, and under the assumption that agents are fully informed, the wage
of low-skilled workers, as well as their choice of effort, will be the same in each firm.
9This just reflects the assumption that each individual is small relative to the economy as a whole.
All these variables are, of course, endogenous in the model.
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the disposable income B j for an employed individual of skill type j = , h,
and equals b for an unemployed individual.
Starting with an individual of the low-skilled type, note that the
individual makes two decisions: (i) an optimal effort choice (which
influences the likelihood of becoming unemployed); (ii) a consumption–
leisure choice conditional on being employed. For a given (I, B)-bundle,
we can define the individual’s indirect expected utility function as
EV(B, I, u, b;w) = max
e
[1 − uϕ(e)]
[
g(B) + v
(
I
w
, e
)]
+ uϕ(e)g(b),
where we have used L = I/w , and E denotes the expectations operator.
The variable uϕ(e) can be interpreted as the probability that any low-skilled
individual becomes unemployed (the overall unemployment rate among low-
skilled workers times the probability of being fired when shirking).10 To rule
out the possibility that low-skilled workers are voluntarily unemployed, we
assume that g(B) + v(I/w, 0) > g(b). Then, in choosing the optimal
level of effort, a low-skilled worker trades off the additional cost of effort
against the gain in expected utility, because of the decreased probability of
becoming unemployed. At an interior optimum,11 the first-order condition
for the effort choice is given by
[1 − uϕ(e)]
∂v
∂e
= uϕ′(e)
[
g(B) + v
(
I
w
, e
)
− g(b)
]
. (2)
Equation (2) implicitly defines e as a function of B , I/w , b, and u, i.e.,
e = e
(
B,
I
w
, b, u
)
. (3)
Based on equation (2), we can derive the following comparative statics
properties of the effort function with respect to B , I , u, b, and w :
10Note that there are three possible states of the world for a low-skilled worker: (i) tenure of
employment in firm i, with probability 1 − ϕ(e); (ii) fired by firm i and hired by another firm,
with probability (1 − u)ϕ(e); (iii) fired by firm i and unemployed, with probability uϕ(e).
11Assuming that ∂v/∂e −→ 0 when e −→ 0, we can rule out the possibility that e = 0 is
optimal. Moreover, if p is sufficiently low, we can also rule out the possibility that e = 1 is
optimal. To see this, notice that e = 1 would be suboptimal provided that
−v
(
I 
w
, 1
)
−
∂v[(I /w ), e ]/∂e |e=1
up
> g(B ) − g(b),
or, equivalently, denoting by (v,e) |e=1 the elasticity of the v-functionwith respect to e evaluated
at e = 1,
(v,e) |e=1
up
> −
g(B ) − g(b)
v[(I /w ), 1]
− 1.
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∂e
∂B
=
uϕ′(e)(∂g/∂B)
Φ
> 0, (4)
∂e
∂I
= −
[1 − uϕ(e)][∂2v/(∂e∂L)] − uϕ′(e)(∂v/∂L)
Φ
1
w
< 0, (5)
∂e
∂u
=
ϕ(e)(∂v/∂e) + [g(B) + v(I/w, e) − g(b)]ϕ′(e)
Φ
> 0, (6)
∂e
∂b = −
uϕ′(e)(∂g/∂b)
Φ
< 0, (7)
∂e
∂w
=
[1 − uϕ(e)][∂2v/(∂e∂L)] − uϕ′(e)(∂v/∂L)
Φ
L
w
> 0, (8)
where
Φ ≡ [1 − uϕ(e)]
∂2v
∂e∂e
− 2uϕ′(e)
∂v
∂e
< 0.
These results are intuitive. An increase in the post-tax income in the
employment state, B , raises the effort as it increases the opportunity cost
of shirking (by widening the gap between the utility if employed and the
utility if unemployed); the opposite effect on effort is induced by an increase
in pre-tax income I .12 An increase in the economy-wide unemployment
rate increases the effort, in order to reduce the probability of ending up
in unemployment, while an increase in the unemployment benefit leads to
decreased effort as it reduces the income loss to the individual if becoming
unemployed.
Noticing that employed, low-skilled workers behave as if they are
maximizing EV[I−T(I), I, u, b;w] with respect to I , we can implicitly
characterize the marginal income tax rate faced by low-skilled workers,
based on the first-order condition, as
T ′(I) = 1 +
∂EV/∂I
∂EV/∂B
. (9)
Regarding high-skilled workers, remember that shirking is not an option
in high-demanding jobs. Thus, provided that high-skilled workers have no
incentive to leave their high-demanding jobs,13 they will maximize
12In this case, the reduction in effort is explained both by a reduction in the opportunity cost of
shirking (as an increase in I  lowers the gap between the utility if employed and the utility if
unemployed) and by our assumption that the marginal disutility of effort is increasing, in absolute
value, in hours of work (i.e., ∂2v/∂e∂L < 0).
13As discussed in the next section, the optimal tax policy chosen by the government will ensure
that this is, indeed, the case.
C© 2019 The Authors. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Fo¨reningen
fo¨r utgivande av the SJE/The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
8 Optimal taxation and efficiency wages
Vh[Ih − T(Ih), Ih;wh] = g[Ih − T(Ih)] + v
(
Ih
wh
, 1
)
with respect to Ih. We can then implicitly characterize the marginal income
tax rate facing a high-skilled individual as
T ′(Ih) = 1 +
∂Vh/∂Ih
∂Vh/∂Bh
= 1 −
1
wh
∂v(Ih/wh, 1)/∂Lh
∂g(Bh)/∂Bh
. (10)
Turning to the production side of the economy, we assume that identical,
competitive firms produce a homogeneous good by using labor as the only
input. The production process is characterized by constant returns to scale.
Because the number of firms is treated as exogenous, it is normalized to one
for notational convenience. Let N and Nh denote the number of workers
employed in low-demanding and high-demanding jobs, respectively. Using
the assumption that eh = 1, the production function is given by
F(eLN, LhNh). (11)
The production function is increasing in each argument, F′1 ≡
∂F/∂(eLN) > 0 and F′2 ≡ ∂F/∂(L
hNh) > 0, the marginal products
are diminishing such that F′′11 ≡ ∂
2F/(∂eLN)2 < 0 and F′′22 ≡
∂2F/(∂LhNh)2 < 0, and the production factors are technical complements,
i.e., F′′12 = F
′′
21 ≡ ∂
2F/∂(eLN)∂(LhNh) > 0. The decision-problem facing
the representative firm is given by
max
w,N ,Nh
F
[
N
I
w
e
(
B,
I
w
, u, b
)
, Nh
Ih
wh
]
−
∑
i=,h
N i I i .
Each individual firm treats the choices made by the government, as
reflected in (I , B , Ih, Bh, b, u), and the wage rate paid to the high-skilled,
wh, as exogenous. By recognizing how the wage rate paid to workers in
low-demanding jobs affects effort through equation (3), the representative
firm chooses w and N based on the following first-order conditions:
∂e
∂L
L
e
= −1, (12)
F ′1 =
w
e
. (13)
Equation (12) implicitly characterizes the optimal wage rate paid to workers
employed in low-demanding jobs, and equation (13) characterizes the
optimal number of agents employed in low-demanding jobs. With the
disposable income in the employment state, B , held constant, the wage rate
enters the effort equation only through I/w = L . Therefore, equation (12)
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is just a variant of the standard condition for wage setting in an efficiency
wage model, i.e., (∂e/∂w)w/e = 1. Finally, the first-order condition for
Nh is given by
F ′2 = w
h, (14)
which defines the equilibrium wage rate for workers in the high-demanding
job, wh.
For later purposes, we need to evaluate how N , w , and wh vary in
response to changes in I , B , Ih, Bh, u, and b. Denoting by σ the elasticity
of substitution between the two labor inputs in production, we obtain the
comparative statics results given in Table 1 (see the Online Appendix).
In particular, note that the elasticity of substitution, σ, plays a key role
in how N responds to variations in I , B , u, and b. If σ > 1 (which
seems to be a plausible assumption based on empirical research),14 we can
see that dN/dI < 0, dN/dB > 0, dN/du > 0, and dw/db < 0.
Regarding the w-responses to variations in I , B , u, and b, note that
the signs of dw/dI , dw/dB , and dw/db are unambiguous (with
dw/dI > 0, dw/dB < 0, and dw/db > 0),15 whereas the sign of
dw/du is in principle ambiguous. However, under the realistic assumption
that ∂2e/∂L∂u > 0,16 we can establish that dw/du < 0. Some of
these results are discussed in greater detail below, where they are used
to characterize the optimal marginal tax and expenditure policy.
Social Decision-Problem
As in much of the earlier literature on optimal taxation, we assume that
the government is the first mover, while the agents in the private sector
(individuals and firms) are followers. Furthermore, we consider the general
governmental objective of reaching a Pareto-efficient resource allocation.
This is accomplished by maximizing the (expected) utility of the low-
skilled subject to a minimum utility restriction for the high-skilled, as well
as subject to the appropriate self-selection and resource constraints. We
also assume that the government (or social planner) wants to redistribute
from high-skilled to low-skilled types, which Stiglitz (1982) refers to as
the “normal” case, meaning that the optimal resource allocation must
14For instance, as reported in Ottaviano and Peri (2012, p. 182), a value of around 2 represents
a reasonable estimate of the elasticity of substitution between high-education and low-education
groups.
15The denominator of the expression on the right-hand side of dw/dB in Table 1 is
unambiguously positive from the second-order conditions of the firm’s profit maximization
problem with respect to w .
16This assumption can be interpreted to mean that an increase in the unemployment rate
counteracts the negative effect that L has on e , ceteris paribus.
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Table 1. Comparative statics results
I 
dN 
dI 
=
1 − (1/σ)
(eL )2F′′11
−
N 
I 
dw
dI 
=
1
L
> 0
dwh
dI 
= −
N 
NhLh
< 0
B
dN 
dB
=
−(∂e/∂B )(wL/e )[1 − (1/σ)]
(eL )2F′′11
dw
dB
=
−(1/L )(∂e/∂B )
(L/w ){[2e/(L )2] − (∂2e/∂L∂L )}
< 0
dwh
dB
=
N L (∂e/∂B )(w/e )
NhLh
> 0
Ih
dN 
dIh
=
N 
whLh
> 0
dw
dIh
= 0
dwh
dIh
= 0
Bh
dN 
dBh
= 0
dw
dBh
= 0
dwh
dBh
= 0
u
dN 
du
=
[(1/σ) − 1](w/e )L (∂e/∂u)
(eL )2F′′11
dw
du
=
−(∂2e/∂L∂u) − (1/L )(∂e/∂u)
(L/w ){[2e/(L )2] − (∂2e/∂L∂L )}
dwh
du
=
w
e
N L
NhLh
∂e
∂u
> 0
b
dN 
db
=
[(1/σ) − 1](w/e )L (∂e/∂b)
(eL )2F′′11
dw
db
=
−(1/L )(∂e/∂b)
(L/w )[2e/(L )2 − ∂2e/(∂L )2]
> 0
dwh
db
=
w
e
N L
NhLh
∂e
∂b
< 0
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be constrained to prevent high-skilled individuals from mimicking the
low-skilled. As such, the optimal marginal tax and expenditure policies
characterized below will satisfy any social welfare function, which is
increasing in the utility of both skill types, if consistent with the assumed
profile of redistribution.
To ensure that the high-skilled prefer the allocation intended for their
type (Ih, Bh) over the before-tax and disposable income combination
intended for the employed the low-skilled (I , B), we impose self-
selection constraints designed to make mimicking unattractive. In our
setting, mimicking can occur in two alternative ways. One possibility
would be for high-skilled individuals to reduce their labor supply in high-
demanding jobs to the extent required to earn I instead of Ih. Because
high-skilled individuals are more productive than low-skilled individuals, a
high-skilled mimicker can reach the income level I by supplying fewer
hours of work than needed by a low-skilled individual. Another possibility
for a high-skilled individual to act as a mimicker would be to take a low-
demanding job, which also gives the before-tax income I . With regards to
the latter option, we assume that, for any given level of effort exerted in the
workplace, the productivity of a high-skilled worker does not differ from the
productivity of a low-skilled worker in a low-demanding job. A high-skilled
individual working in a low-demanding job will thus be paid the wage
rate w (instead of the wage rate wh). If choosing a low-demanding job,
the effort exerted by a high-skilled individual will depend on the outside
option if caught shirking and fired. Assuming that, if fired from a low-
demanding job, a high-skilled individual can always find employment in a
high-demanding job (i.e., no threat of becoming unemployed), the optimal
effort choice of a mimicker in a low-demanding job would be zero. Note
that the utility of a mimicker would, in this case, exceed the utility faced
by the low-skilled type, as the effort provided by a high-skilled individual
in a low-demanding job falls short of the effort chosen by low-skilled
individuals.17
Even though both available mimicking strategies require a high-skilled
mimicker to earn the same before-tax income as a low-skilled individual,
for convenience hereafter we use the term “income-replication” strategy to
17By making alternative assumptions about the outside option, and thus the fallback utility, of a
high-skilled individual caught shirking in a low-demanding job, we can relax the (admittedly
extreme) assumption, leading to the result that the optimal effort chosen by a high-skilled
individual in a low-demanding job is nil. The qualitative results we obtain would be unchanged
as long as the effort provided by a high-skilled individual in a low-demanding job falls short
of the effort provided by a low-skilled individual. This would indeed be the case unless we
were to assume that a high-skilled individual caught shirking in a low-demanding job has a zero
probability of being re-employed in a high-demanding job.
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refer to the case when a high-skilled individual behaves as a mimicker and
chooses a high-demanding job (working fewer hours than a low-skilled
individual), whereas we use the expression “job-replication” strategy to
refer to the case when a high-skilled individual behaves as a mimicker
and chooses a low-demanding job (exerting less effort than a low-skilled
individual).
Now, because the government can implement any desired combination of
work hours and disposable income for each skill type subject to constraints,
we follow the common practice in much of the earlier literature on optimal
nonlinear taxation by writing the social decision-problem directly in terms
of the before-tax and disposable incomes, instead of in terms of parameters
of the tax function.
We introduce the following notation, pertaining to a high-skilled
individual behaving as a mimicker by choosing, respectively, the income-
replication strategy and the job-replication strategy,
V̂h,e=1(B, I ;wh) ≡ g(B) + v
(
I
wh
, 1
)
, (15)
V̂h,e=0(B, I ;w) ≡ g(B) + v
(
I
w
, 0
)
. (16)
Thus, the social-decision problem can be written as
max
I ,B,Ih,Bh,b,u
EV(B, I, u, b;w),
subject to
(δ) Vh(Bh, Ih;wh) ≥ V¯h, (17)
(λ) Vh(Bh, Ih;wh) ≥ V̂h,e=1(B, I ;wh), (18)
(ζ) Vh(Bh, Ih;wh) ≥ V̂h,e=0(B, I ;w), (19)
(μ) F
(
eN
I
w
, Nh
Ih
wh
)
≥ πhBh + NB + (π − N)b, (20)
(θ) u = 1 −
N(B, I, u, b)
π
, (21)
where the Lagrange multipliers attached to the respective constraints are
given in parentheses. The δ-constraint represents the minimum utility
constraint, implying that the utility of each high-skilled individual must not
fall short of V¯h. The λ-constraint and the ζ-constraint are two self-selection
constraints that jointly ensure that a high-skilled individual has no incentive
to act as a mimicker (i.e., has no incentive to earn the income level intended
for the low-skilled type through the income-replication or job-replication
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strategy, respectively).18,19 The μ-constraint is the economy-wide resource
constraint, requiring that the aggregate output must not fall short of the
aggregate consumption. Note also that, instead of substituting the expression
for the unemployment rate into the objective and constraint functions, the
unemployment rate is used as an additional (and artificial) control variable,
which explains the θ-constraint. This formulation is convenient by allowing
us to interpret the Lagrange-multiplier θ in terms of a (utility-based) shadow
price of unemployment.
In our analysis, we restrict attention to the case where unemployment
is an involuntary phenomenon for low-skilled individuals by assuming that
g(B) + v(I/w, e) > g(b) at a social optimum (as mentioned above).
Note that this rules out the possibility that high-skilled individuals find it
attractive to drop out of the labor market in order to live on unemployment
benefits.20
The first-order conditions of the social decision-problem are presented in
the Online Appendix. Next, we turn to the implications of these conditions
for the optimal public policy.
18We have already remarked how a high-skilled mimicker would optimally choose e = 0 under
a job-replication strategy. Thus, given that workers in low-demanding jobs are monitored with
exogenous probability p, it follows that such amimickerwouldbe caught shirkingwith probability
p. Therefore, the condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to deter mimicking via a job-
replication strategy is g(Bh ) + v(Ih/wh, 1) ≥ (1 − p)[g(B ) + v(I /w, 0)] + p[g(Bh ) +
v(Ih/wh, 1)], or, equivalently g(Bh ) + v(Ih/wh, 1) ≥ g(B ) + v(I /w, 0), which is what is
required by the ζ-constraint in the social decision-problem.
19Note that
d
dI 
[V̂ h,e=1(B, I  ;wh ) − V̂ h,e=0(B, I  ;w )] =
d
dI 
[
v
(
I 
wh
, 1
)
− v
(
I 
w
, 0
)]
=
∂v[(I /wh ), 1]
∂(I /wh )
[
1 +
N  I 
Nh Ih
]
1
wh
< 0.
Therefore, there is only one value of I  at which a high-skilled mimicker is indifferent between
the two available mimicking strategies. For sufficiently high values of I  , the job-replication
strategy will be more attractive than the income-replication strategy, and vice versa.
20We can rewrite the two self-selection constraints as V h (Bh, Ih ;wh ) ≥ max{V̂ h,e=1(B, I  ;
wh ); V̂ h,e=0(B, I  ;w )}, or equivalently (using equations (15) and (16)) asV h (Bh, Ih ;wh ) ≥
g(B ) + max{v(I /wh, 1); v(I /w, 0)}. If max{v(I /wh, 1); v(I /w, 0)} = v(I /wh, 1),
we find that v(I /wh, 1) > v(I /w, 0) > v(I /w, e ). From g(B )+v(I /w, e ) > g(b) it
then follows that g(B )+ v(I /wh, 1) > g(b); that is, high-skilled workers have no incentive to
drop out of the labor market. If, instead, max{v(I /wh, 1); v(I /w, 0)} = v(I /w, 0), we find
that v(I /w, 0) > v(I /w, e ). Once again, from g(B ) + v(I /w, e ) > g(b) it follows
that g(B ) + v(I /w, 0) > g(b), implying that high-skilled workers have no incentive to drop
out of the labor market.
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III. Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy
To simplify the presentation, we introduce the following short notation for
marginal rates of substitution between the before-tax income and disposable
income for a low-skilled individual and a mimicker, respectively, where
we have distinguished between the income-replication and job-replication
strategies for the mimicker:
MRSI,B = −
∂EV/∂I
∂EV/∂B
> 0;

MRSh,e=1I,B = − ∂V̂h,e=1/∂I
∂V̂h,e=1/∂B
> 0;

MRSh,e=0I,B = − ∂V̂h,e=0/∂I
∂V̂h,e=0/∂B
> 0.
For notational convenience, we also define “utility compensated” wage and
employment responses to an increase in the before-tax income, I , such that
dw˜
dI
=
dw
dI
+ MRSI,B
dw
dB
, (22)
dN˜
dI
=
dN
dI
+ MRSI,B
dN
dB
, (23)
dw˜h
dI
=
dwh
dI
+ MRSI,B
dwh
dB
. (24)
Equations (22) and (23) measure how an increase in the before-tax income,
I , affects the wage rate, w , and the number of employed individuals, N ,
respectively, of the low-skilled agents, when they are compensated by an
increase in the disposable income, B , to remain at the initial (expected)
utility level. Similarly, equation (24) shows how a marginal increase in
I , compensated by a change in B to leave the (expected) utility of
low-skilled individuals unchanged, affects the wage rate paid to workers in
high-demanding jobs, wh. We are now ready to characterize the marginal
income tax rates implemented for the two skill types.
Proposition 1. The marginal income tax rate faced by high-skilled workers is
negative (positive) if (I − B + b)π + θ/μ > 0 (< 0) and given as follows:
T ′(Ih) = −
1 − u
πh Ih
[
(I − B + b)π + θ
μ
]
. (25)
Let ˜N ,I  denote the compensated elasticity of N with respect to I , such that
˜N ,I  = (dN˜/dI)(I/N).Themarginal income tax rate faced by low-skilled
workers can then be written as
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T ′(I) =
λ(∂V̂h,e=1/∂B)
μ(1 − u)π
(
MRSI,B − 
MRSh,e=1I,B )
+
ζ(∂V̂h,e=0/∂B)
μ(1 − u)π
(
MRSI,B − 
MRSh,e=0I,B )
+
1
μ(1 − u)π
(
ζ
∂V̂h,e=0
∂w
−
∂EV
∂w
)
dw˜
dI
+
1
μ(1 − u)π
(
λ
∂V̂h,e=1
∂wh
− μNhLhMRShI,B
)
dw˜h
dI
−
1
π I
[
(I − B + b)π + θ
μ
]
˜N ,I  . (26)
Proof : See the Online Appendix. 
According to equation (25), high-skilled individuals should face a
negative marginal income tax rate under realistic assumptions, implying
that their labor supply is distorted upwards. This finding is reminiscent of a
result derived by Stiglitz (1982) in a model with competitive labor markets,
where a negative marginal income tax rate for high-skilled individuals works
as a device to reduce the wage differential between the skill types.21 In our
setting, a negative marginal income tax rate for high-skilled individuals
is justified as a mechanism through which the government can stimulate
the demand for low-skilled labor. This is, in turn, socially beneficial for
two reasons: first, by increasing the net tax revenue (provided that the
transfer paid to the unemployed is larger than the transfer paid to low-
skilled workers), and, second, by reducing the unemployment rate, which
is socially desirable whenever the social value of decreased unemployment
measured in terms of public funds, θ/μ, is positive (see Proposition 2).
However, the fact that a distortion in the labor supply behavior of high-
skilled workers is useful as a device for boosting the demand for low-skilled
workers should not be interpreted as implying that general equilibrium wage
effects play no role in equation (25). The reason is that, even though a
change in Ih or Bh per se has no direct effects on w and wh (as we can
see from Table 1), a variation in Ih triggers a change in the number of
workers N that each firm is willing to hire in low-demanding jobs.22 At
21See also Pirttila¨ and Tuomala (2001), and Gahvari (2014a, 2014b).
22Notice that a variation inBh has no effect on N  ,w , andwh asBh does not enter the systemof
equations (12)–(14). The variable Ih , however, enters the system of equations (12)–(14) through
equations (13) and (14). Nonetheless, a variation in Ih does not affect the equilibrium wage rates
w and wh because its direct effect on wages is exactly offset by the indirect effect on wages
that works through the induced change in N  .
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the economy-wide level, this will have an effect on the unemployment rate
and, as a consequence, on the level of effort e that low-skilled workers will
choose. Finally, this change in the incentives to provide effort affects the
equilibrium wage rates (through equations (12) and (14)), which in turn
has an effect on the self-selection constraints faced by the government.
The fact that the general equilibrium wage effects of a variation in Ih
are indirect and mediated by unemployment-rate effects explains why, in
equation (25), they are “concealed” in the term θ/μ, which captures the
social value of decreased unemployment. As we discuss at length when
presenting Proposition 2, most of the policy incentives determining the
structure of θ/μ are, indeed, related to general equilibrium wage effects.
Turning to marginal income taxation of low-skilled workers in equation
(26), the first two terms on the right-hand side tell us how taxation should
distort the labor supply of low-skilled workers if the wage rates and
employment are fixed. Both terms depend on self-selection considerations
and would vanish in a first-best environment where individual skill is
observable, in which case λ = ζ = 0. If the self-selection constraint given in
equation (18) – that is, the constraint associated with the income-replication
strategy – is binding (λ > 0), then the first term on the right-hand side of
equation (26) can be either positive or negative. This is interesting in itself:
in a standard optimal income tax model with competitive labor markets,
the corresponding term would be unambiguously positive because of the
assumption that the marginal rates of substitution satisfy the condition
∂MRSI,B/∂w < 0.23 In the standard model, normality of consumption is
a sufficient condition to guarantee that the single-crossing condition holds.
In our setting, however, this is not enough. When comparing a low-skilled
individual with a high-skilled mimicker adopting the income-replication
strategy, it is still true that a high-skilled individual needs fewer hours to
earn the same before-tax income as a low-skilled individual (as wh > w).
At the same time, however, a high-skilled individual employed in a high-
demanding job exerts more effort than a low-skilled individual employed
in a low-demanding job. Therefore, because ∂MRS jI,B/∂e
j > 0, it is, in
principle, possible that the first term on the right-hand side of equation
(26) takes a negative sign.24
23This is typically referred to as the agent-monotonicity condition (see Seade, 1982).
24The intuition for ∂MRS jI ,B/∂e
j > 0 is that increased on-the-job effort makes leisure outside
the workplace more valuable at the margin, ceteris paribus (i.e., for given values of I , B, and
w). Formally, as MRS jI ,B = −∂v/∂L
j/(∂g/∂B)w j , we find that sign(∂MRS jI ,B/∂e
j ) =
sign(∂2v/∂e∂L). Because our initial assumption was that ∂2v/∂e∂L < 0, it follows that
∂MRS
j
I ,B/∂e
j > 0. Notice that the sign of the first term on the right-hand side of equation (26)
remains ambiguous also if we drop the possibility of high-skilled workers performing the jobs
of low-skilled workers.
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Instead, if the binding self-selection constraint given by equation (19) –
that is, the constraint associated with the job-replication strategy is binding
(ζ > 0) – then the second term on the right-hand side of equation (26) will
be unambiguously positive, thus contributing to a higher marginal income
tax rate for low-skilled workers. The reason is that a low-skilled individual
exerts a positive level of effort, whereas a high-skilled mimicker adopting
the job-replication strategy exerts lower effort (and, in particular, no effort
at all under our assumptions about the outside option for a high-skilled
individual caught shirking in a low-demanding job). This implies that a
low-skilled individual attaches a higher marginal value to leisure outside
the workplace than a mimicker adopting the job-replication strategy (despite
the fact that they are paid the same wage rate, w). An increase in the
marginal income tax rate, which induces low-skilled workers to reduce their
hours of work, will thus hurt the mimicker more than it hurts low-skilled
workers, meaning that this policy opens up for more redistribution through
a relaxation of the job-replication self-selection constraint.
The remaining components in equation (26) reflect wage- and
employment-responses to a change in the income-consumption bundle for
low-skilled workers. The responses in N and w arise as a consequence
of efficiency wage setting for low-skilled workers; in turn, these induce a
spill-over effect on wh as a result of the imperfect substitutability between
factors in the production function.
Starting with the marginal tax response to an induced change in the
hourly wage rate paid to low-skilled workers, w , note first that
∂EV
∂w
= −[1 − uϕ(e)]
L
w
∂v(I/w, e)
∂L
> 0.
Here, we have used the fact that the indirect effects of w , arising via
the individuals’ labor supply and effort choices, vanish as a consequence
of optimality (i.e., by the envelope theorem). Note that ∂EV/∂w can be
interpreted as a direct expected benefit faced by each low-skilled individual
following an increase in their wage rate. If the self-selection constraint
associated with the job-replication strategy (i.e., equation (19)) is binding,
such a wage increase would also make mimicking more attractive, which
explains the first term in parentheses in the third row of equation (26).25 We
can then interpret the difference in parentheses in the third row of equation
(26) as reflecting the net social cost of an increase in w for a given
unemployment rate; if this difference is positive (negative), an increase in
25We have
ζ
∂V̂ h,e=0
∂w
= −ζ
I 
(w )2
∂v(I /w, 0)
∂L
> 0
.
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w would lead to lower (higher) welfare, ceteris paribus. As we show in the
Online Appendix (see equation (C12)), we would expect that dw˜/dI > 0
(such that a combined increase in the before-tax and disposable income for
low-skilled individuals pushes up their hourly wage rate). Thus, there will
be an incentive for the government to increase (decrease) the labor supply
of low-skilled workers via a lower (higher) marginal tax rate if
ζ
∂V̂h,e=0
∂w
−
∂EV
∂w
=
{
[1 − uϕ(e)]
∂v(I/w, e)
∂L
−ζ
∂v(I/w, 0)
∂L
}
L
w
< 0 (> 0). (27)
For instance, the third row of equation (26) will provide an incentive to
lower the marginal tax rate faced by low-skilled agents in the case when
the constraint associated with the job-replication strategy is non-binding
(ζ = 0).26
Consider now the marginal tax response to an induced change in
the hourly wage rate paid to high-skilled individuals, wh. Note first that
an increase in wh would be costly for the government by tightening
the λ-constraint, making it more attractive for high-skilled individuals to
become mimickers by choosing the income-replication strategy.27 However,
an increase in wh would also allow the government to raise additional
tax revenue from high-skilled individuals without violating their minimum
utility restriction (as prescribed by the δ-constraint).28 We can then interpret
the difference λ∂V̂h,e=1/∂wh − μNhLhMRShI,B, appearing in the fourth row
26More generally, recalling that ∂2v/∂e∂L < 0 by assumption, the sign of equation (27) is more
likely to be negative the higher the effort level e , the lower the unemployment rate u, and the
lower the value of the Lagrange multiplier ζ .
27Denoting by L̂h,e=1 the labor supply of a high-skilled individual choosing the income-
replication mimicking strategy, we have
∂V̂ h,e=1
∂wh
= −
I 
(wh )2
∂v(I /wh, 1)
∂L̂h,e=1
> 0.
28Because
∂V h
∂wh
= −
Lh
wh
∂v(Ih/wh, 1)
∂Lh
= −Lh
∂v(Ih/wh, 1)
∂Ih
= LhMRShI ,B
∂g(Bh )
∂Bh
,
we obtain
∂V h
∂wh
+
∂V h
∂Bh
dBh = 0
for
dBh = −
∂V h/∂wh
∂V h/∂Bh
= −LhMRShI ,B .
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of equation (26), as capturing the net social cost of a marginal increase in
wh (for a given unemployment rate). Because dw˜h/dI < 0 (see equation
(C11) in the Online Appendix), it follows that wage-response considerations
pertaining to wh call for increasing (decreasing) the labor supply of low-
skilled individuals via a lower (higher) marginal tax rate if
λ
μ
∂V̂h,e=1
∂wh
> (<) NhLhMRShI,B .
Finally, a direct employment effect of marginal taxation, showing how
a compensated (for low-skilled individuals) increase in I affects N , is
captured by the last term in equation (26). Note, first, that the sign of ˜N ,I 
is, in principle, ambiguous. For the purpose of interpretation, we focus
on the case where dN˜/dI < 0. As shown in the Online Appendix (see
equation (C10)), a sufficient condition for dN˜/dI < 0 is that σ ≥ 1, which
is a realistic assumption based on available empirical evidence (see footnote
14).29 In this case, the government has an incentive to distort the labor
supply of low-skilled workers downwards through higher marginal taxation
for two reasons. First, when the transfer paid to the unemployed is larger
than the transfer paid to the employed low-skilled workers (I−B+b > 0),
an increase in N will increase the net tax revenue. Second, an increase in
N leads to a lower unemployment rate, which is socially beneficial when
the social value of decreased unemployment measured in terms of public
funds, θ/μ, is positive. Employment-related motives for higher marginal tax
rates are also found in earlier research on optimal redistributive taxation
under equilibrium unemployment based on models of trade-unionized labor
markets or search models.30
Taking into account the fact that the number of high-skilled individuals is πh = Nh , a marginal
increase in wh allows the government to extract a total amount NhLhMRShI ,B of additional
tax revenue from the group of high-skilled individuals.
29For instance, this condition is satisfied under under a Cobb–Douglas production function where
σ = 1. In this case, we can use equation (C10) to derive dN˜ /dI  = −N /I  , which implies
˜N  , I  = −1.
30A more detailed comparison is complicated by the fact that studies differ in several important
ways; not just in terms of how the labor market is modeled. Aronsson and Sjo¨gren (2003)
analyze optimal redistributive income and commodity taxation in an economy with two skill
types and monopoly-union wage setting, and they find employment motives for marginal tax
policy reminiscent of those derived here. Aronsson and Sjo¨gren (2004) consider a model with
wage bargaining between trade unions and firms (a right-to-manage framework), and they show
that the optimal tax policy will, in certain cases, implement a full-employment equilibrium, in
which the marginal income tax rate is zero. However, if such an equilibrium cannot be reached
(which, in their study, depends on restrictions in the use of profit taxation), themarginal income tax
policy entails employment effects reminiscent of those described above.These two studies assume
that both the number of employed people and the hours of work per employee are endogenous,
as we do. In the context of a search model, Hungerbuhler et al. (2006) show that the average tax
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Before moving to the analysis of the factors determining θ/μ, three
remarks are in order. First, note that the final row of equation (26) is
the exact counterpart of the expression on the right-hand side of equation
(25).31 Thus, albeit implicitly, the final row of equation (26) captures general
equilibrium wage effects of a (compensated) variation in I . In particular,
it captures those indirect effects that are mediated by unemployment rate
variations.
Second, the reason why the terms appearing in the third and fourth
rows of equation (26) have no counterpart in equation (25) is that, whereas
changes in I or B exert effects on w and wh, which are defined for a
given unemployment rate, a change in the bundle intended for high-skilled
individuals only affects w and wh indirectly via the unemployment rate.
Third, by using the short notation
˜wh,I  ≡
dw˜h
dI
I
wh
< 0 and ˜w,I  ≡
dw˜
dI
I
w
> 0,
rates are increasing and the marginal tax rates are positive. The intuition is that higher marginal
tax rates lead to lower wage claims, and thus to lower unemployment among each skill type. See
also Lehmann et al. (2011) for a generalization to a case where the marginal tax rates might be
negative at the lower end of the skill distribution. In the latter two studies, the hours of work
per employee (of various types) are fixed, which makes the policy incentives somewhat different
from those examined here.
31In both cases, the structure is the same.Given thatdN /dIh = N /whLh anddN /dBh = 0,
we have dN˜ /dIh = N /whLh . Therefore, we can rewrite the right-hand side of equation (25)
as
−
1 − u
πh Ih
whLh
N 
[(
I  − B + b
)
π +
θ
μ
]
dN˜ 
dIh
or, equivalently,
−
1
πh
[
I  − B + b +
θ
μπ
]
dN˜ 
dIh
.
The final row of equation (26) can be rewritten as
−
1
π I 
I 
N 
[(
I  − B + b
)
π +
θ
μ
]
dN˜ 
dI 
,
or, equivalently,
−
1
N 
[
I  − B + b +
θ
μπ
]
dN˜ 
dI 
.
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equation (26) could be equivalently restated as
T ′(I) =
λ(∂V̂h,e=1/∂B)
μ(1 − u)π
[
MRSI,B − 
MRSh,e=1I,B (1 − ˜wh,I  )]
+
ζ(∂V̂h,e=0/∂B)
μ(1 − u)π
[
MRSI,B − 
MRSh,e=0I,B (1 − ˜w,I  )]
−
1
μ(1 − u)π
∂EV
∂w
dw˜
dI
−
1
(1 − u)π
NhLhMRShI,B
dw˜h
dI
−
1
π I
[
(I − B + b)π + θ
μ
]
˜N ,I  .
Note that the policy incentives created by each self-selection constraint
are now merged into a singe term given by the first and second rows,
respectively. Because ˜wh,I  < 0 and ˜w,I  > 0, and by accounting for the
general equilibrium effects that operate via the self-selection constraints, we
can see that the incentive term related to the discouragement of the job-
replication strategy is still positive and becomes even larger (the second
row). However, it becomes more likely that the incentive term related to
the discouragement of the income-replication strategy calls for a downward
adjustment in the marginal tax rate implemented for low-skilled individuals
(the first row).
We can now turn to the factors determining the social value of decreased
unemployment, θ/μ. For this purpose, let
MRSu,b = −
∂EV/∂u
∂EV/∂b
=
g(B) + v(I/w, e) − g(b)
u∂g(b)/∂b > 0 (28)
denote the marginal rate of substitution between the unemployment rate
and the unemployment benefit for a low-skilled individual, and define the
utility compensated wage and employment responses to an increase in the
unemployment rate such that
dw˜
du =
dw
du + MRS

u,b
dw
db , (29)
dN˜
du =
dN
du + MRS

u,b
dN
db , (30)
dw˜h
du =
dwh
du + MRS

u,b
dwh
db . (31)
Proposition 2 gives an expression for the social value of decreased
unemployment at a second-best optimum.
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Proposition 2. The social value of decreased unemployment can be expressed
as
θ
μ
=
π
Γ
{
uMRSu,b + (I
 − B + b)˜N ,1−u +
Nh
N
MRShI,B I
h ˜wh,1−u
}
+
λ
μΓ
∂V̂h,e=1
∂wh
dw˜h
du +
1
μΓ
(
ζ
∂V̂h,e=0
∂w
−
∂EV
∂w
)
dw˜
du , (32)
where
Γ ≡ 1 +
1
π
dN˜
du , ˜N ,1−u ≡ −
1 − u
N
dN˜
du , and ˜wh,1−u ≡ −
1 − u
wh
dw˜h
du .
Proof : See the Online Appendix. 
Note, first, that Γ in the denominator on the righ-hand side of equation
(32) represents a feedback effect, which is reminiscent of the corresponding
effect entering in expressions for the social shadow price of a consumption
externality (e.g., Sandmo, 1980; Pirttila¨ and Tuomala, 1997). As shown
by Sandmo (1980), stability requires that the feedback effect is positive.
Therefore, we base our discussion of the result in Proposition 2 on the
assumption that Γ > 0. In our case, where we have used the social
first-order conditions for u and b to derive equation (32), it follows
that the feedback effect depends on how the number of employed low-
skilled individuals is influenced by both the unemployment rate and the
unemployment benefit. The term dN˜/du in the expression for Γ can be
thought of as the employment response to a utility compensated increase
in the unemployment rate, where the compensation is measured in terms
of the unemployment benefit.
We can interpret πu MRS
u,b
in the first row of equation (32) as the
sum of the marginal willingness to pay to avoid unemployment among the
unemployed, where πu represents the number of unemployed persons. This
component resembles the sum of the marginal willingness to pay to avoid a
public bad, with the modification that it is only measured over the relevant
part of the population.
The remaining two terms in the first row of equation (32) can be
interpreted as public revenue effects. A direct public revenue effect of a
variation in the unemployment rate is captured by the second term in curly
brackets, which reflects that the net tax revenue increases by I − B + b =
T(I) + b when a low-skilled individual switches from unemployment to
employment. The increased tax revenue is, in turn, multiplied by ˜N ,1−u ,
measuring the extent to which each firm’s demand for low-skilled workers is
affected by a change in the economy-wide unemployment rate. By using the
comparative statics results provided in Table 1, we can re-express equation
(30) as
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dN˜
du =
[(1/σ) − 1](w/e)L
(eL)2F ′′11
∂e˜
∂u
.
By using equations (6) and (7) to derive
∂e˜
∂u
=
∂e
∂u
+
∂e
∂b MRS

u,b =
ϕ(e)(∂v/∂e)
Φ
> 0, (33)
we can see that the sign of the compensated response of N to a marginal
increase in u depends on the elasticity of substitution between the labor
inputs. Therefore, this public revenue effect vanishes in the special case
where σ = 1, in which dN˜/du = 0. Instead, in the empirically plausible
case where σ > 1, we have dN˜/du > 0 and, therefore, ˜N ,1−u < 0, which
implies that public revenue considerations lead to a decrease in θ/μ.
The third term in curly brackets in the first row of equation (32)
captures another public revenue effect, descending from the fact that a
variation in the unemployment rate among low-skilled individuals affects
the equilibrium wage rate paid in high-demanding jobs. Exploiting equation
(33), from the comparative statics results provided in Table 1 we can see that
dw˜h
du =
w
e
NL
NhLh
∂e˜
∂u
> 0. (34)
Therefore, an increase in the unemployment rate will lead to an increase
in the wage rate paid to high-skilled workers, (i) because an increase
in the unemployment rate leads to higher effort among the low-skilled,
and (ii) because of the assumed technical complementarity between
skilled and unskilled labor in terms of the production function. In turn,
this opens up the possibility of raising additional tax revenue from
high-skilled individuals without violating the minimum utility restriction.
As a consequence, the final term in curly brackets is also negative and
contributes to a further downward adjustment in θ/μ.32
The self-selection constraints directly affect the social value of decreased
unemployment through the second row of equation (32). The first term
captures the effect of a variation in wh, induced by a change in
the unemployment rate, on the self-selection constraint associated with
the income-replication strategy. With dw˜h/du > 0, an increase in the
unemployment rate makes this mimicking strategy more attractive, which,
in turn, contributes to raising the social value of decreased unemployment.
Finally, the second term appears because an increase in the unemployment
rate affects the wage rate paid in low-demanding jobs, which leads to an
32Notice that dw˜h/du > 0 =⇒ ˜wh ,1−u < 0.
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additional social cost or benefit for reasons similar to those illustrated when
discussing equation (26). In particular, dw˜/du can be thought of as a utility
compensated wage response to an increase in the unemployment rate, where
the compensation appears in the form of an increase in the unemployment
benefit, while ζ∂V̂h,e=0/∂w − ∂EV/∂w can be interpreted as the net
social cost of an increase in the wage paid to the low-skilled (as explained
above in the context of marginal income tax policy). As we show in the
Online Appendix that dw˜/du < 0, the final term on the right-hand side
of equation (32) contributes to an increase in the social value of decreased
unemployment whenever ζ∂V̂h,e=0/∂w − ∂EV/∂w < 0 (as would be
the case, for instance, if the ζ-constraint is non-binding at a second-
best optimum). The intuition is, in this case, that reduced unemployment
would also imply an indirect welfare benefit through an effect on the wage
rate paid in low-demanding jobs. The opposite policy incentive arises if
ζ∂V̂h,e=0/∂w − ∂EV/∂w > 0.
To complete the characterization of the optimal second-best policy, we
now turn to the policy rule for the unemployment benefit. For this purpose,
let
MRSb,B =
∂EV/∂b
∂EV/∂B
=
uϕ
(
e
)
∂g (b) /∂b[
1 − uϕ
(
e
) ]
∂g
(
B
)
/∂B
> 0
denote the marginal rate of substitution between the unemployment benefit
and the disposable income in the employed state for a low-skilled individual.
Also, define the utility compensated wage and employment responses to an
increase in the unemployment benefit, b, such that
dN˜
db =
dN
db − MRS

b,B
dN
dB
, (35)
dw˜
db =
dw
db − MRS

b,B
dw
dB
, (36)
dw˜h
db =
dwh
db − MRS

b,B
dwh
dB
. (37)
Proposition 3 characterizes the efficient level of the unemployment benefit
at a second-best optimum.
Proposition 3. The optimal unemployment benefit abides by the following
policy rule:
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(1 − u)πMRSb,B = uπ
 −
(
I − B + b + θ
μπ
)
dN˜
db
−πhLhMRShI,B
dw˜h
db −
MRS
b,B
μ
×
(
λ
∂V̂h,e=1
∂B
+ ζ
∂V̂h,e=0
∂B
)
+
λ
μ
∂V̂h,e=1
∂wh
dw˜h
db
+
1
μ
(
ζ
∂V̂h,e=0
∂w
−
∂EV
∂w
)
dw˜
db . (38)
Proof : See the Online Appendix. 
The left-hand side of equation (38) can be interpreted as the sum of the
marginal willingness to pay for a higher unemployment benefit, measured
among the employed individuals of the low-skilled type. In particular,
MRS
b,B
reflects the amount of income that each low-skilled individual
would be willing to forego, when employed, in order to marginally
raise their consumption in the event of becoming unemployed. Thus,
(1 − u)πMRS
b,B
can be interpreted as measuring the aggregate insurance
benefit for low-skilled individuals of a marginal increase in the consumption
available if becoming unemployed.33
Turning to the right-hand side, the direct public budget cost of a
marginal increase in b (which is paid to the uπ workers who are
unemployed) is measured by the first term, while the second and third terms
are employment and public revenue effects reminiscent of those described
in the context of Proposition 1. More specifically, the second term captures
the net social gain of the employment effect induced by a compensated
marginal increase in b, where the compensation is measured in terms of
B . By using the comparative statics results provided in Table 1, we can
rewrite equation (35) as
dN˜
db =
[(1/σ) − 1][(wL)/e]
(eL)2F ′′11
(
∂e
∂b − MRS

b,B
∂e
∂B
)
=
[(1/σ) − 1][(wL)/e]
(eL)2F ′′11
∂e˜
∂b .
33(1 − u)πMRS
b,B
can also be interpreted as the additional income tax revenue that the
government can collect if marginally raising the unemployment benefit in a compensated way;
that is, raising b while at the same time adjusting T (I  ) upwards to leave the expected utility
unchanged for low-skilled individuals.
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From our discussion in Section II, we find that ∂e/∂b < 0 and ∂e/∂B >
0, implying ∂e˜/∂b < 0. Thus, as long as σ > 1 (which, as we pointed out
before, is the empirically most plausible scenario), we have dN˜/db < 0.
Therefore, with I − B + b + θ/μπ > 0, the employment effects of
a compensated increase in b calls for an upward adjustment in the net
resource cost of raising the unemployment benefit. This contributes to
decrease the unemployment benefit, ceteris paribus. Similarly, the third term
on the right-hand side of equation (38) (i.e., the first term in the second
row) captures a public budget effect resulting from the fact that a variation
in the unemployment benefit affects the wage rate facing workers in high-
demanding jobs. From the comparative statics results provided in Table 1,
we can derive
dw˜h
db =
dwh
db − MRS

b,B
dwh
dB
=
(w/e)NL
NhLh
∂e˜
∂b < 0, (39)
which implies that an increase in the unemployment benefit reduces the
before-tax wage rate faced by high-skilled individuals. In turn, a lower
wage necessitates a lower income tax payment by high-skilled individuals
in order to leave their utility unchanged. This indirect public budget effect
leads to an increase in the net marginal cost of raising the unemployment
benefit.
The fourth and fifth terms on the right-hand side of equation (38)
and the first term in the third row reflect the fact that a compensated
marginal increase in b (an increase in b accompanied by a utility
compensated upward adjustment in T(I)) contributes to relax the self-
selection constraint. First, as low-skilled workers face the risk of becoming
unemployed whereas a potential mimicker does not, a compensated (for
low-skilled agents) increase in the unemployment benefit makes mimicking
less attractive, irrespective of which strategy the mimicker chooses. This
effect is summarized by the fourth term on the right-hand side of equation
(38), where the first component in brackets is negative under the income-
replication strategy (λ > 0 and ζ = 0), while the second component is
negative under the job-replication strategy (λ = 0 and ζ > 0). Intuitively,
a transfer paid to the unemployed is an instrument better targeted to low-
skilled individuals than a transfer to low-income earners in general. This
targeting advantage, lowers the net resource cost of raising the generosity
of the unemployment benefit system. The fifth term captures instead the
effect of an induced change in wh on the utility of a high-skilled mimicker
adopting the income-replication strategy. Because dw˜h/db < 0 (see equation
(39)), it follows that a marginal increase in b has the further advantage of
lowering the utility associated with this type of mimicking strategy, lowering
the net resource cost of making the unemployment benefit more generous.
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The final term on the right-hand side of equation (38) captures the net
social cost of a change in w induced by a compensated marginal increase
in b. In general, this component can be either positive or negative. To
go further, we use the comparative statics results provided in Table 1 to
calculate an expression for dw˜/db as follows:
dw˜
db =
dw
db − MRS

b,B
dw
dB
= −
1
L
∂e˜/∂b
(L/w)[2e/(L)2 − ∂2e/(∂L)2]
> 0.
By inducing firms to raise the wage rate paid to low-skilled workers, a
compensated increase in b would produce a benefit (in terms of higher
utility due to reduced work hours) both for employed low-skilled agents and
for high-skilled mimickers choosing the job-replication strategy. When the
former (latter) effect dominates, such that ζ∂V̂h,e=0/∂w − ∂EV/∂w < 0
(> 0), the wage response to a compensated marginal increase in b is socially
beneficial (detrimental), thus lowering (raising) the net resource cost of
making the unemployment benefit more generous.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have integrated efficiency wage setting with the theory
of optimal redistributive income taxation. In doing so, we have used a
model with two skill types, where efficiency wage setting characterizes
the labor market faced by the low-skilled, while the high-skilled face a
conventional, competitive labor market. Furthermore, there are two types
of jobs in this economy: low-demanding jobs, which can be carried out
by all individuals, and high-demanding jobs, which can only be carried
out by high-skilled individuals. High-demanding jobs require maximum
effort per hour spent at the workplace, whereas effort per work hour
is a decision-variable for individuals employed in low-demanding jobs,
such that individuals employed in this type of job have the option to
shirk with an exogenous probability of detection. The government uses a
nonlinear income tax and an unemployment benefit to redistribute income
from high-skilled individuals to low-skilled individuals, and to correct for
imperfect competition in the labor market. As such, the government must
also recognize that high-skilled individuals have two different options of
mimicking the income of the low-skilled: either by reducing the hours of
work when employed in high-demanding jobs (referred to as the income-
replication strategy) or by choosing low-demanding jobs (referred to as the
job-replication strategy).
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We would like to emphasize four results. First, the marginal income tax
rate implemented for high-skilled individuals is likely to be negative. Albeit
reminiscent of a result derived by Stiglitz (1982), the underlying mechanism
is different: the negative marginal income tax rate implemented for high-
skilled individuals provides a mechanism for increasing the demand for
low-skilled labor. As such, it contributes to increase the net tax revenue
and reduce the unemployment rate, both of which are socially desirable
under plausible assumptions.
Second, the marginal income tax rate faced by low-skilled individuals
is not necessarily positive (as it would be in a standard model with
competitive labor markets and no extensive margin of labor supply).34
Although employment-related motives behind the tax policy (i.e., the
incentive to increase employment among low-skilled individuals) are likely
to push up this marginal tax rate, its sign might also depend on which
of the two self-selection constraints is binding. Whereas the self-selection
constraint designed to prevent the job-replication strategy works to increase
the marginal tax rate of low-skilled individuals, the qualitative effect of the
self-selection constraint designed to prevent the income-replication strategy
is ambiguous. The intuition is that, although the income-replication strategy
allows high-skilled individuals to spend more time on leisure than low-
skilled individuals, a high-skilled mimicker employed in a high-demanding
job still exerts more effort per work hour than the mimicked, low-skilled
individual under the income-replication strategy.
Third, the social value of decreased unemployment takes a form
reminiscent of the shadow prices of a public bad in the sense of
depending on (i) the sum of the marginal willingness to pay to avoid
unemployment among the unemployed, (ii) the effects induced by the self-
selection constraint, and (iii) the tax revenue effects created by varying
the unemployment rate. Note also that the social value of decreased
unemployment directly affects the marginal income tax rates facing both
skill types at the second-best optimum, despite the fact that unemployment
can only arise among low-skilled individuals in our model.
Fourth, an increase in the unemployment benefit typically leads to a
relaxation of the relevant self-selection constraint, irrespective of whether
potential mimickers adopt an income-replication or job-replication strategy.
As such, this effect contributes to reduce the social resource cost of the
unemployment benefit.
34The result that the optimal marginal tax rate faced by low-skilled workers is not necessarily
positive when firms pay efficiency wages in low-demanding jobs is reminiscent of a similar
finding obtained by da Costa and Maestri (2019). By modifying the canonical Mirrleesian model
to accommodate the assumption that firms have market power in the labor market, they show that
almost all workers face negative marginal tax rates.
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